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When Do Companies Train Low-Skilled
Workers? The Role of Institutional
Arrangements at the Company and
Sectoral Level
Philip Wotschack
Abstract
The article investigates how institutional arrangements at the organizational and
sectoral level affect the likelihood and size of employer investments in continuing
training for low-skilled workers in Germany. By building on comparative
political economy and organizational theory, hypotheses are derived and tested.
Regression analysis based on the IAB Establishment Survey (waves 2011 and
2013) shows evidence that the training participation of low-skilled workers is
related to institutional differences between sectors and organizations. At the
organizational level, structures of employee representation and formalized HR
policies are positively associated with higher rates of training participation
among low-skilled workers. Moreover, there is evidence that low-skilled workers
benefit in organizational clusters that are characterized by structures of
employee representation, formalized HR practices, and bargaining coverage.
At the sectoral level, this study finds evidence that low-skilled workers in the
health care and manufacturing sector are more likely to receive continuing
training.
1. Introduction
In all European societies, low-skilled workers face particular labour market
risks in terms of unemployment, bad working conditions or low pay
(Eurofound 2009). These risks will further increase with on-going changes in
the world of work, often leading to higher skill requirements and a shrinking
demand for low-skilled work (Berger and Frey 2015; Dengler and Matthes
2019; OECD 2016). Continuing training forms a key measure to respond
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to these developments by improving skills, labour market opportunities and
career prospects for this group of workers (Cedefop 2015; Martin and Rüber
2016; McVicar et al. 2016; Mohr et al. 2016: 553). It is the crucial question
of this article how low-skilled workers can be better integrated in employer-
provided continuing training. The focus is on the role of institutional
arrangements at the organizational and sectoral level in Germany.
Like in many European countries (Abramovsky et al. 2011; Martin
and Rüber 2016; Ramos and Harris 2012), training participation of low-
skilled workers is low in Germany. According to representative data for
Germany (in 2017), only one out of two companies has devoted (working)
time or money to continuing training (IAB 2017). On average, one third
of the employees participated in continuous training. While around 40
per cent of the skilled workers took part in continuing training, the
share among the low-skilled workers (doing work that does not require a
vocational degree) was only 20 per cent (IAB 2017; see also Janssen and
Leber 2015: 6).
The low training participation of low-skilled workers raises questions for
both the underlying obstacles and pathways to overcome these obstacles.
While there is a relative broad literature on training participation in general
(see Frazis et al. 2000;Grund 2012;Hansson 2007;Käpplinger 2007;Wiseman
and Parry 2017), fewer studies have focused on the particular group of
low-skilled workers (see Abramovsky et al. 2011; Bellmann et al. 2015;
Martin and Rüber 2016; Mohr et al. 2016). Moreover, the role of the
institutional context did not receive much attention, so far. Studies addressing
the training participation of low-skilled workers have been mainly concerned
with labour shortages (Bellmann et al. 2015) or task characteristics (Mohr
et al. 2016). To my best knowledge, the role of institutional differences
between organizations and sectors has neither been explored systematically
nor addressed theoretically in previous research on training participation of
low-skilled workers.
A qualitative study based on 10 firm-level case studies in Germany could
identify a number of favourable institutional influences and mechanisms at
the sectoral and company level (Wotschack and Solga 2014). Besides the
(well-known) factors that increase in-company training in general (such
as a shortage on the external labour market, technological change or an
existing educational infrastructure), institutional embeddedness of the
company proved to be an essential prerequisite for the integration of low-
skilled workers through training programs. This includes diverse company
agreements and collective regulations, long-term employment relations,
worker representation, strong norms of solidarity, as well as tight cooperation
between the corporate actors. Moreover, the high proportion of low-skilled
workers who participate in further training could not be explained by a
single characteristic. In fact, several factors worked together in specific
constellations.
This article wants to extend previous research on continuing vocational
training by addressing the question, how institutional differences between
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organizations and sectors shape the training participation of low-skilled
workers. The database is representative German IAB Establishment Survey
by the German Institute for Employment research (IAB).
Theoretically, the study builds on the one hand on insights from
comparative political economy. This literature emphasizes the importance
of institutional arrangements, such as collective bargaining structures or the
skill formation system, for labour market inequalities and social exclusion
(see Carstensen and Ibsen 2019; Durazzi and Geyer 2019; Hall and Soskice
2001; Swank et al. 2008; Thelen 2009). However, the role and impact of these
structures on continuing vocational training of low-skilled workers did not
receive much attention so far. On the other hand, the article refers to insights
from organizational theory (Abraham 2001; Beckert 1996; Granovetter 1985;
Steinback et al. 2010). Leading is the idea that institutional arrangements
at the organizational level (such as employee representations, formalized
HR policies or long-term employment relationships) are able to counteract
mechanisms of discrimination of low-skilled workers.
Germany that is in the focus of this study represents a prominent case of
a coordinated market economy with a strong dual apprenticeship system,
centralized collective bargaining and a strong regulation of continuing
training activities at the company level (Allaart et al. 2009, 105). Since
the 1990s, coverage in collective bargaining has been shrinking, however,
due to increasing drop outs of firms (particularly smaller ones) and an
increasing number of precarious workers (particularly in the service sectors)
(Swank et al. 2008). As a consequence, there is evidence for a growing
divide between coverage of skilled core workers in the manufacturing sector
and a large number of low-skilled workers, who are not covered by the
collective bargaining system (Sengenberger 1987; Thelen 2009: 482). Under
this condition, inclusive unions and public policies and regulations gain
importance for the inclusion of weak employee groups, as scholars from
comparative political economy have pointed out (Doellgast et al. 2018;
Thelen 2014).
Likewise, the dual apprenticeship system has become more segmented.
The growing service economy is less often conforming to the standards of
the traditional dual training system. There is evidence that the focus on
standardized portable skills and exchangeable qualifications on occupational
labour markets is partly replaced by a system more geared towards firm-
specific skill needs (mainly in large firms) (Thelen 2009), less demanding
(two-year) apprenticeships mainly in the service economy or school-based
vocational tracks (like in the health and care sector) (Estévez-Abe 2005;
Thelen and Busemeyer 2008). As a consequence, the need to obtain
supplement qualifications, general and specific, has been increasing in these
sectors. In contrast to the traditional dual-apprenticeship system that is
characterized by larger upfront investments in general and firm-specific
skills, continuous training investments over the life course might gain more
importance (Thelen 2014) and foster life-long learning also for low-skilled
workers.
C© 2019 The Authors. British Journal of Industrial Relations published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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This article wants to shed light on these issues by taking a closer
look at the role of sectoral and organizational differences: How does
the training participation of low-skilled workers vary between sectors and
organizations with different institutional settings. Is there evidence that
sectors (such as manufacturing) with centralized bargaining structures,
strong unions and a traditional dual-apprenticeship system differ from
service sectors where precarious employment is widespread (such as Hotel
Business and Gastronomy) or sectors with strong public regulations or
more school-based educational tracks (such as Human Health and Social
Work)? And to what extent do organizations make a difference within
and across sectors? How do institutional organizational arrangements and
human resources strategies shape the training participation of low-skilled
workers?
Empirically, the focus is on employer-provided continuing vocational
training. By definition, continuing vocational training aims at teaching
new skills or adapting existing skills to new technical and professional
developments (Bellmann et al. 2015). Employer-provided continuing training
forms an important area of continuing training in Germany. It includes
all training measures, which are organized by companies or taking place
in the company context, such as courses, teachings or workplace-related
learning.
The role of employer-provided continuing training turns out to be
ambivalent: on the one hand, it is by far the largest segment of continuing
vocational training in Germany with a share of 72 per cent (BMBF 2019).
On the other hand, it is primarily focused on maintaining and advancing the
skills relevant to the needs and operations of the work process. In the fore
are operational skill needs and short-term adaptation measures to respond
to acute technological, organizational, or market-related changes. Long-term
training programs that offer substantial career opportunities in terms of
job mobility, professional reorientation or promotion to higher occupational
positions are less present, as reflected by the very low percentage of certified
further training measures (cf. BMBF 2015: 48).
Nevertheless, access to employer-provided training plays an important
role for the employability, labour market opportunities and quality of
work of low-skilled workers (McVicar et al. 2016; Mohr et al. 2016).
It responds faster and more targeted to current developments and new
requirements in the world of work. The measures also have a more direct
practical relevance and the workers remain involved in processes of learning,
which both help to reduce barriers on the side of low-skilled workers to
participate in training (Beer 1999: 192). Even when the outcomes in terms
of professional qualifications and individual capabilities tend to be small,
in-firm training extends existing competencies and maintains employment
security and employability. A recent study (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018)
even found evidence that a considerable share of low-skilled workers in
Germany works in positions that would actually require a professional
qualification. It suggests that employer-provided training has helped these
C© 2019 The Authors. British Journal of Industrial Relations published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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workers to achieve such positions without participating in formal training
programs.
2. Theory and hypotheses
Previous research has identified determinants that increase the likelihood of
employer investments in continuing training (e.g. Frazis et al. 2000; Grund
2012; Käpplinger 2007: 5; Neubäumer et al. 2006: 451; Oosterbeek 1998). It
showed evidence that the probability of training investments is higher in larger
establishments, certain sectors (such as Education, Health and Care sector), in
companies with a good business situation, labour shortages or with modern
production facilities (see Bellmann et al. 2010; Ramos and Harris 2012;
Wiseman and Parry 2017). Moreover, a high engagement in initial vocational
training (Düll and Bellmann 1998), the presence of employee organizations,
cooperative work relations (Nienhüser et al. 2006), institutionalized HR
practices (Käpplinger 2007; Osterman 1995) or employee-oriented HR
policies (Frazis et al. 2000; Hansson 2007) have been proven to be favourable
influences.
However, most of these studies focus on characteristics that affect
continuing training participation in general. Studies with a focus on the
training participation of low-skilled workers are rarer. They show evidence
that training participation of low-skilled workers varies between countries,
sectors and firms of different sizes. It is higher in the Scandinavian countries
and countries with more public spending on education (Martin and Rüber
2016), in certain sectors (such as Education, orHumanHealth & SocialWork),
in larger firms, in firms reporting labour shortages (Bellmann et al. 2015) or for
low-skilled workers reporting higher task flexibility (Mohr et al. 2016; Sanders
and de Grip 2004).
Theoretically, differences in training participation are usually explained
by processes of selection (by employers) and self-selection (by employees)
(Frazis et al. 2000; Ramos and Harris 2012; Wozny and Schneider 2014).
Barriers at the individual level, such as the missing subjective perception of
existing continuing education needs, lack of interest in continuing education,
subjective learning barriers or external constraints (such as family demands)
can prevent training participation — even when there are good opportunities
at the organizational level (Martin and Rüber 2016; Shields 1998). Many of
these factors most frequently apply to low-skilled workers (Dobischat et al.
2002; Mohr et al. 2016). Form the viewpoint of the employers, the willingness
to train workers decreases with a lack of financial resources or perceived need
for training, or when expected returns to training seem to be low or uncertain
(Abramovsky et al. 2011; Acemoglu and Pischke 1998; Wiseman and Parry
2017).
Problems of uncertainty are a common explanation for variations in firms’
training activities (Gerner and Stegmaier 2009; Oosterbeek 1998; Ramos
and Harris 2012). Transaction cost theory stresses the risk of opportunistic
C© 2019 The Authors. British Journal of Industrial Relations published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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behaviour (Neubäumer et al. 2006; Williamson 1985). From the worker’s
perspective, desired returns to training (such as financial benefits, job security
or promotion) can be denied by the employer. Employers, in contrast,
bear the risk that training investments do not lead to the desired gains
in productivity. Moreover, returns to training are jeopardized by career
interruptions or employer change (‘poaching’) (Mohrenweiser et al. 2019).
In order to cope with these risks, organizations can introduce contractual
arrangements (governance structures). Since it is costly to establish such
arrangements, transaction costs are increasing and make continuing training
more costly.
The transaction cost approach offers one important explanation for the
overall low level of training activities of employers and employees. However,
existing group differences in the participation in further training are not
fully explained. Some groups of employees (such as older employees or low-
skilled workers) show rather low rates of training participation, although
the risk of opportunistic behaviour is limited due to the poorer employment
prospects of these groups making it more difficult to change the employer.
Alternative theoretical accounts, such as filter theory, explain the lower
training participation of low-skilled workers by the (mis)attribution of low
and/or uncertain returns to training (Arrow 1973). According to this view,
employers tend to ascribe lower returns and greater risk of loss of training
investments to low-skilled workers. Since they are not able to predict training-
related gains in productivity, they focus primarily on groups of people, where
returns to training seem high and safe. Certain personal characteristics,
such as the educational degree (measured in certificates), gender, age or
employment relationship, serve as an indirect indicator signalling lower risk
and more gains in productivity. As a consequence, high-skilled, young, male,
full-time employed workers are more likely to receive continuing training
(Asplund 2005).
When we follow filter theory, there is a good reason to be pessimistic about
the chances of low-skilled workers to participate in continuing training. As
long as mechanisms of statistical discrimination are at work, the negative
signal of a low or missing qualification (as an indicator of low or uncertain
returns to training) might counteract training participation, even when the
company is more likely to invest in training in general. Due to the stigma
of a missing qualification, low-skilled workers would still be the last who
are integrated in employer-provided training. This raises the question how
mechanisms of statistical discrimination can be cancelled out or at least
reduced for low-skilled workers.
Institutional theories emphasize the importance of the social context for
(solving) problems of uncertainty in economic exchange relations (Abraham
2001; Beckert 1996: 142; Granovetter 1985) and stress the importance of
institutionalized structures and regulations (Carstensen and Ibsen 2019;
Durazzi and Geyer 2019; Martin and Swank 2004; Sengenberger 1987;
Theelen and Busemeyer 2008; Thelen 2009). When we apply insights from
these theories to the issue of (overcoming) low training participation of
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low-skilled workers, we can derive the following hypotheses on the role of
institutional influences at different levels:
2.1. Institutional influences at organizational level
At the organizational level, institutionalized regulations and structures
of employee representation can counteract the discrimination of low-
skilled workers by establishing alternative criteria for the distribution of
training investments (hypothesis H1). I would expect a favourable influence
of employee representations and collective agreements. When training
investments are not (solely) driven by the economic criterion of efficient
returns but codetermined by employee representations (that are formally
obliged to represent the entire work force also regarding issues of continuing
training), mechanisms of statistical discrimination should lose their power
(H1.1). Collective agreements link wage levels to achieved skill levels, tasks
or work experience of employees. By doing so, they set indirect incentives
for low-skilled workers to participate in continuing training in order to
achieve higher wages. Some collective agreements (e.g. in the metal and
electrical industry) even lay down rules for continuing training. However,
these rules are mostly of procedural nature. Their impact on actual training
behaviour of firms is weak, since they do not establish binding regulations
but rather encourage employers to evaluate the skill demands of the work
force (Bahnmüller and Hoppe 2012). Since such evaluations can help to
detect skill needs of low-skilled workers, I would nevertheless expect a positive
effect on their training participation when the firm has collective bargaining
agreements (H1.2).
2.2. Human resources strategies
Following organizational theory (Steinback et al. 2010), workplace
inequalities are also determined by formal organizational practices (such
as institutionalized regulations and HR policies). Across sectors and
organizations, training participation of low-skilled workers should vary with
the type and shape of HR strategies, ranging from market and cost-driven
strategies on the one hand to more institutionalized and employee-oriented
practices on the other hand. I expect that low-skilled workers are better off
when training investments are governed by formalized, employee-oriented
HR policies (hypothesis H2). When HR policies are concerned with issues
of employability, low-skilled workers should receive more training due to
their poorer employability (H2.1). When the performance of low-skilled
workers is evaluated on a regular base by formalized measures, decisions
on training participation should be based on (more) actual information
on the real productivity of workers, and less on (negative) signals and
ascribed attributions by single managers (H2.2). I expect a similar effect
when long-term employment relationships provide more information on the
performance of low-skilled workers (H2.3).
C© 2019 The Authors. British Journal of Industrial Relations published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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2.3. Institutional influences at sectoral level
The comparative political economy literature goes beyond the economic
rationales of single employers by focusing on the role of coordinating macro-
level institutions, such as the system of collective bargaining, public policies or
the skill formation system (Hall and Soskice 2001; Swank et al. 2008; Thelen
2009; Thelen 2014). Germany traditionally stands for a coordinated market
economy with rather strong centralized bargaining structures and a (dual)
training system based on standardized (portable) and firm-specific training.
Both institutional arrangements are traditionally represented by the large
German manufacturing sector. At the same time, coverage rates under both
arrangements are decreasing, mainly due to shrinking bargaining coverage,
varying training standards and more precarious jobs in the growing service
economy (Thelen and Busemeyer 2008; Thelen 2009). As a consequence,
the risk of inequalities between and within sectors increases. The literature
suggests that public policies and inclusive unions are the keys to overcome
this dualism (Doellgast et al. 2018; Thelen 2014).
Following the comparative political economy literature, I assume that
institutional differences between sectors are related to (a) public policies and
legal regulation, (b) dualism between dominant and more resourceful sectors
(such asmanufacturing) and weaker sectors (such as the service economy) and
(c) collective bargaining, particularly in service sectors (such asHotel Business
and Gastronomy), where the workers have the least bargaining power.
Regarding the integration of low-skilled workers in continuing training, I
expect the following differences between sectors (hypothesis H3).
Training participation of low-skilled workers should be higher in sectors
with more public regulation and school-based training (such as Human
Health and Social Work) as compared to the private sector (H3.1). In the
private sector, larger upfront investments in portable and firm-specific skills
(dual apprenticeship system) might lower the firm’s overall need to provide
supplement training at later stages of the life course. Firms in sectors with
(initial) school-based training, in contrast, face a higher need to provide
supplement qualifications in order to enable their workers to meet firm and
job-specific skill demands (Thelen 2014). Low-skilled workers might benefit
from this overall higher engagement of firms in continuing training.Moreover,
they have to conform to legal provisions on skill requirements and continuing
training that establish a stronger demand for training also for low-skilled
workers (Bechmann et al. 2012; Hilbert et al. 2014).
When the role of manufacturing is large (as it is the case for Germany),
the risk of dualism between core workers (in the manufacturing sector) and
workers in the service sector increases (Sengenberger 1987; Thelen 2014: 74).
As a consequence, the training participation of low-skilled workers will be
higher in the manufacturing sector as compared to the service economy (due
to dualism) (H3.2).
Eventually, I expect that the training participation of low-skilled workers
will vary with firms’ bargaining coverage. I expect a positive impact of
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collective agreements in sectors with low bargaining coverage and a large share
of weak employee groups, such as Hotel Business and Gastronomy (H3.3).
Trade unions in this sector should bemore concernedwith issues of precarious
employment and inequality among the work force (as compared to the
manufacturing or public sector). Only a minority of employers in this sector
is part of an employer association and has collective bargaining coverage
(Schneider and Vogel 2018). In this respect, having collective bargaining
coverage and being part of an employer association expresses a stronger
interest in issues of employability and solidarism (see also Martin and Swank
2004).
3. Research design, methods and variables
The IAB Establishment Panel (Fischer et al. 2009; Ellguth et al. 2014),
waves 2011 and 2013, is used in order to test the outlined hypotheses.
Data access was provided via on-site use at the Research Data Centre
(FDZ) of the German Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the Institute
for Employment Research (IAB) and subsequently remote data access.
The IAB Establishment Panel provides elaborated information on company
characteristics of about 12,000 German companies per year, including a
detailed measure of employer-provided continuing training participation for
different groups of employees. The Panel is based on a random sample selected
from all German companies registered at the German Federal Employment
Agency’s (BA). The data collection was done via oral interviews with
employers or employer representatives based on a standardized questionnaire.
The following analyses refer to thewave 2011 because of its particular thematic
focus on institutionalizedHR practices. Information on training participation
in 2013 is used in order to observe how the selected organizational and sectoral
characteristics are related to training participation over time.
Following the definition of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB),
the focus is on employer-sponsored continuing training only. Thus, only
training activities, which were (at least partly) funded by the employer in
terms of investments of time and/or money, are taken into account. All
analyses are based on a (merged) subsample of 4,009 establishments that
participated in wave 2011 and 2013 (Appendix Table A1). According to the
IAB questionnaire, low-skilled workers are ‘workers doing jobs that require
no professional qualification’. This definition is based on the current job and
not on the level of qualification of the employees. The data give detailed
information on training participation rates of low-skilled workers. Yet, no
information is provided on the intensity, length and type of training (e.g. in
terms of rates of formal or non-formal training, fresh-up courses or advanced
training). The dataset also faces common method bias, since dependent and
independent variables come from the same source. Nevertheless, the dataset is
an established and authorized source of representative firm-level information
in Germany.
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Dependent Variables
Regression analyses are used to test the hypotheses. The first dependent
(dummy) variable is training investments (yes/no) in low-skilled workers in
the first half of 2013. It refers to the question: ‘was your establishment active
in continuing vocational training in the first half of the year?’ When the
answer was ‘Yes, working hours and/or financial resources were provided for
continuing training’, and ‘low-skilled workers’ (at least one) participated in
continuing training (in 2013), the establishment was considered to support
training of low-skilled workers. The second dependent (metric) variable
measures training participation rates of low-skilled workers in 2013, defined
as the share of low-skilled workers who received training. It is calculated by
dividing the number (or cases) of low-skilled workers who received training
by the total number of low-skilled workers in the establishment.
Explanatory Variables
Most independent variables have been observed in 2011. Only for the business
situation, labour shortages, investments in EDP and recent innovations
(regarding work organization, products, services or the production process),
retro perspective information referring to 2010 was used.
Institutional Influences at Organizational Level
A dummy variable was created indicating whether or not there is a works
council or other form of employee representation in the company. If this is
the case, it is assumed that the interests of low-skilled workers receive more
attention in HR policies. Based on the question whether or not a collective
agreement applies to the establishment, a dummy variable was constructed.
HR Strategies
Whether or not the HR policies are institutionalized is measured by the
question: ‘Does your establishment work with’: (a) ‘written plans for staff
development?’, (b) ‘formally laid down procedures for appointments?’, (c) ‘job
descriptions for the majority of jobs?’, (d) ‘written target agreements with
employees?’, (e) ‘written evaluations of job performance?’. A factor analysis
(main component analysis) confirms that one factor explains 62 per cent of
the total variance. The dummy variable for formalization of HR policies is
encoded with a value of 1 for all companies that exhibit a positive factor
charge, otherwise with the value 0.
Differences in the orientation of HR policies are measured by the following
indicator: ‘How important are the following strategies for your establishment
to meet future needs for skilled workers?’ HR policies are classified as
employee oriented (vs cost-cutting and outsourcing strategies) when they
conform highly to the following strategies: ‘keeping older workers longer in
the company’, ‘long-term personal development of employees’, ‘improving
the reconciliation of family and working life’, or ‘creating attractive work
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conditions’. A factor analysis confirms that one factor explained the four items
of 47 per cent of the total variance. The dummy variable for an employee-
orientedHRpolicy has a value of 1 for all establishments with a positive factor
charge.
Long-term employment relationships: I assume that low-skilled workers
have longer employment periods, when the company reports that all
employees have permanent employment contracts. Since the indicator only
refers to formal long-term employment (contracts), the actual period of
employment of low-skilledworkers can deviate of course. However, alternative
measures of factual fluctuation provided by the dataset do not differentiate
between specific groups of employees, such as low-skilled workers. For that
reason, they are not included in the indicator, but considered only as a control
variable.
Institutional Influences at Sectoral Level
Sectoral differences are investigated by using dummy variables for 15 sectors
(according to the study by Bechmann et al. 2012: 94). Moreover, I carry out
separate analyses for three selected sectors (Manufacturing, Hotel Business
and Gastronomy and Human Health and Social Work) representing different
institutional settings regarding collective bargaining, skill formation and
public regulation.
Control Variables
By building on previous studies (see e.g. Behringer and Käpplinger 2008;
Bellmann andLeber 2011; Bellmann et al. 2015), a number of standard control
variables were included in the analysis: company size (four categories based
on the number of employees), compound operation (is the companies part
of a corporate network), workforce composition (metric variables for the
proportion of women, part-time workers, workers older than 49 years, low-
skilled workers and high-skilled workers, holding a university degree), region
(company located in eastern or western part of Germany), technical level of
equipment (‘up to date’), expected employment development in the coming
year (‘stable’ or ‘rising’) and whether training participation rates are based on
the number of persons (who received training) or number of trainings (cases).
Moreover, I included dummy variables for the profitability in the last
fiscal year (2010) (‘very good’ or ‘good’), labour shortages (‘When you think
about the upcoming next two years, do you expect problems to find suitable
candidates with appropriate professional qualifications?’), innovations (2010)
regarding work organization, products, services or production, investments
in EDP (2010) (‘computers, information and communication technology’)
and infrastructure for training (‘Does the establishment conform to existing
statutory requirements for the provision of initial vocational training?’).
Eventually, investments in continuing training (all workers) and training
participation rates of skilled workers are included as additional variables, in
order to control for the overall training inclination of the firm.
C© 2019 The Authors. British Journal of Industrial Relations published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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4. Empirical findings
Logistic and OLS regression analyses have been carried out in order to
study the role of different social and economic determinants in continuing
training participation of low-skilled workers (Table 1). Regarding the role
of the institutional organizational context, the analyses confirm the positive
impact of employee representations (H1.1) on both the chance of training
investments in low-skilled workers (M2) and their training participation rate
in 2013 (M1, M1). In contrast to hypothesis H1.2 on the positive impact of
collective agreements, there is no evidence for significant effects on training
investments or training participation rates of low-skilled workers.
With regard to the role ofHR strategies, the analysis provides evidence that
both the likelihood of training investments and rates of training participation
are significantly higher for low-skilled workers when their company is
characterized by formalized HR practices (H2.1) or employee-oriented HR
policies (H2.2). However, the effect of employee-oriented HR policies on
training participation rates of low-skilled workers is only significant on a 10
per cent level.
Hypothesis H2.3 on the positive impact of long-term employment
relationships is not confirmed by the data. There is even evidence for
an opposite effect: companies with (exclusively) permanent employment
contracts are less likely to invest in training of low-skilled workers and train
fewer low-skilled workers.
Regarding the role of institutional sectoral characteristics, the analyses
provide evidence for the expected differences (hypothesis H3). Firms in the
sector Human Health and Social Work show a higher probability to support
training of low-skilled workers in 2013 (as compared to the Manufacturing
sector) (Table 1). They also have significantly higher participation rates.
This pattern is in line with hypothesis H3.1. It supports the argument that
sectors with more school-based vocational education and legal regulation
of skill requirements (such as Human Health and Social Work) are
characterized by higher rates of training participation among low-skilled
workers. However, due to the limitations of the data, it is not possible to
evaluate to what extent this effect is related to legal regulation or school-based
vocational education.
Additional analyses (not presented here) show that firms in most service
sectors are more likely to train their work force in general. In contrast to
the manufacturing sector, where larger upfront investments in portable and
firm-specific skills (due to the dual apprenticeship system) lower the need for
supplement training at later stages of the life course (Thelen 2014), firms in
the service economy are more likely to invest in supplement qualifications
in order to meet firm and job-specific skill demands. However, regarding
training investments focused on low-skilled workers, this pattern rather
looks the opposite (Table 1). In line with hypothesis H3.2, firms in most
service sectors (such as Trade, Hotel Business and Gastronomy, Financial and
Insurance Services, Business and Professional Services, Education and Public
C© 2019 The Authors. British Journal of Industrial Relations published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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TABLE 1
Determinants of Training Participation of Low-Skilled Workers in 2013
Models M1: Logistic regression; average marginal effects; standard errors in parentheses
Model M2: OLS regression; standardized coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
Continuing
training
low-skilled
workers yes/no
Training
participation rate
low-skilled
workers
Model M1 (2013) M2 (2013)
Explanatory variables (wave 2011)
Collective agreement 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
Formalized HR practices (IC) 0.06** (0.02) 0.06** (0.01)
Employee-oriented HR policies (NC) 0.03** (0.01) 0.02(*) (0.01)
Long-term employment contracts (TC) −0.03* (0.02) −0.03* (0.01)
Works councils or employee
representation
0.04** (0.02) 0.04** (0.01)
Control variables
Large company (> 250 employees) Ref. Ref.
Medium-sized company (50–249
employees)
−0.05** (0.02) −0.01 (0.01)
Small company (10–49 employees) −0.08** (0.02) −0.04* (0.02)
Very small company (< 10 employees) −0.15** (0.03) −0.09** (0.02)
Compound operation 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Business situation (2010) very good or
good
0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
Stable employment development −0.01 (0.02) −0.01 (0.01)
Proportion of women 0.09** (0.03) 0.05* (0.02)
Proportion of highly qualified workers −0.18** (0.05) −0.10** (0.03)
Proportion of older workers (50+) −0.02 (0.04) 0.01 (0.02)
Proportion of part-time workers 0.04 (0.03) 0.04(*) (0.02)
Proportion of low-skilled workers 0.29** (0.03) 0.08** (0.02)
Labour shortages (skilled workers) (2010) 0.03* (0.01) 0.04** (0.01)
Investments in EDP (2010) 0.02(*) (0.02) 0.01 (0.01)
Recent innovation (2010) 0.01 (0.01) −0.00 (0.01)
Modern technical equipment 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Infrastructure for vocational training −0.00 (0.02) −0.00 (0.01)
Region (West Germany) 0.02(*) (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Investment in continuing training in 2013 0.23** (0.02) /
Training participation rate of skilled
workers (2013)
/ 0.26** (0.01)
Training participation rate based on
persons (not cases)
/ 0.15** (0.01)
Sectors (15 dummy variables) See Table 2 See Table 2
Pseudo R2/ adjusted R2 0.20 0.18
n (establishments) 4,009 4,009
(*) significant on 10% level; * significant on 5% level; ** significant on 1% level.
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, waves 2011 and 2013; own calculations (only companies with
low-skilled workers).
Administration) were less likely to train their low-skilled workers in 2013.
Moreover, they were training fewer low-skilled workers (Table 2, models M1
and M2).
The effects of collective bargaining coverage are explored by separate
regression analyses (Table 3). For most sectors (including Manufacturing),
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TABLE 2
Determinants of Training Participation of Low-Skilled Workers in 2013
Model M1: Logistic regression; average marginal effects; standard errors in parentheses
Model M2: OLS regression; standardized coefficients; standard errors in parentheses
Continuing
training
low-skilled
workers yes/no
Training
participation rate
low-skilled
workers
Model M1 (2013) M2 (2013)
Explanatory and control variables See Table 1 See Table 1
Sectors (15 dummy variables)
(1) Manufacturing Ref. Ref.
(2) Agriculture and Foresting 0.07 (0.04) −0.02 (0.03)
(3) Mining and Quarrying 0.00 (0.10) 0.03 (0.07)
(4) Electricity, Gas, Water supply −0.04 (0.04) −0.02 (0.03)
(5) Construction −0.01 (0.03) −0.02 (0.02)
(6) Trade −0.10** (0.02) −0.05** (0.02)
(7) Transport and Warehousing 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.02)
(8) Information and Communication −0.12 (0.08) −0.02 (0.04)
(9) Hotel Business and Gastronomy −0.06* (0.03) −0.05** (0.02)
(10) Financial and Insurance Services −0.16** (0.05) −0.12** (0.03)
(11) Business and Professional Services −0.07** (0.02) −0.06** (0.02)
(12) Education −0.12** (0.04) −0.07** (0.03)
(13) Human Health and Social Work 0.04 (0.02) 0.06** (0.02)
(14) Other Services −0.02 (0.04) −0.05 (0.03)
(15) Public Administration −0.09** (0.03) −0.08** (0.02)
Pseudo R2/adjusted R2 0.20 0.18
n (operations) 4,009 4,009
(*) significant on 10% level; * significant on 5% level; ** significant on 1% level.
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, waves 2011 and 2013; own calculations (only companies with
low-skilled workers).
collective bargaining coverage does not have a significant effect on training
participation of low-skilled workers. In contrast to hypothesis H3.3, we do
not find the expected effect for the sector Hotel Business and Gastronomy
(models M4a and M6b). Surprisingly, collective bargaining coverage in the
sector Human Health and Social Work has significant positive effect on the
likelihood that firms invest in training for low-skilled workers (model M5a).
Yet, there is no significant effect on the training participation of low-skilled
workers (model M5b).
Moreover, we find evidence that the role of HR practices and institutional
influences at the firm level varies between sectors. Formalized HR practices
are related to higher training participation rates among low-skilled workers in
Manufacturing (models M3a and M3b) and Hotel Business and Gastronomy,
(models 4a and 4b) but not in Human Health and Social Work (models 5a
and 5b). Moreover, training participation of low-skilled workers is related to
employee-oriented HR policies in the Manufacturing sector (models 3a and
3b). Within the three selected sectors, structures of employee representation
are not significantly related to differences in training participation of low-
skilled workers.
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Apart from the outlined institutional influences, training participation of
low-skilled workers is related to a number of additional firm characteristics
(control variables). In line with findings from previous studies (see Bellmann
et al. 2015), labour shortages increase the likelihood and participation
of low-skilled workers in employer-provided continuing training (Table 1).
Investments in EDP are related to a higher likelihood that companies invest in
training for low-skilled workers. Smaller companies, in contrast, are less likely
to invest time or money in continuing training of low-skilled workers and have
lower training participation rates.
The share of low-skilled workers in the company has a particularly
strong impact: establishments with a large share of low-skilled workers are
characterized by a higher likelihood of investments in training for low-skilled
workers and higher participation rates.
Eventually, the likelihood of training investments for low-skilled workers
is positively related to compound operation, a lower share of high-skilled
employees, and regional differences (firm located in West Germany). The
analyses also show evidence that training participation rates of low-skilled
workers are positively affected by a higher share of women or part-timers in
the company and a lower share of high-skilled employees.
In-Depth Analyses — the Role of Institutional Configurations
Past research has shown that the investigated institutional influences in terms
of employee representation, collective agreements, employee-oriented HR
policies or formalized HR practices often occur together in characteristic
configurations (Goedicke et al. 2006; Wotschack 2017; Wotschack and Solga
2014). These configurations might influence the training participation of
low-skilled workers in addition to the single explanatory variables presented
in the analyses above. In order to tackle this problem, it seems useful to
explore characteristic types of companies (according to selected institutional
characteristics) by using a cluster analyses (single and complete linkage
procedure) and to study their impact on training participation of low-skilled
workers.
The results of the cluster analysis (complete linkage method) suggest
that the included institutional characteristics (bargaining coverage,
employee representation, employee-oriented HRM and formalized HR
practices) occur in distinct constellations (Table 4). Plausible solutions are
suggested for three clusters (Calinski/Harabasz pseudo-F index: 3318),
five clusters (Calinski/Harabasz pseudo-F index: 3107) and nine clusters
(Calinski/Harabasz pseudo-F index: 3296). The three-cluster solution
provides the best results and sufficiently large groups of cases.
Overall, we find three distinct institutional configurations. First, there is a
large group of companies (cluster A: ‘Low Embeddedness’) that lacks most
of the different institutional company characteristics. Only a minority of
companies has employee representations (19 per cent) bargaining coverage (31
C© 2019 The Authors. British Journal of Industrial Relations published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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TABLE 4
Three Company Clusters in Terms of Institutional Embeddedness (Mean Values)
Cluster (share in %)
Formalized
HR practices
Employee-
oriented
HRM
Bargaining
coverage
Employee
representation
A ‘Low Embeddedness’
(n = 1,702)
0.28 0.00 0.31 0.19
B ‘Employee-Oriented
HRM’ (n = 933)
0.46 1.00 0.33 0.00
C ‘Regulation’ (n = 1,374) 0.91 0.64 0.83 1.00
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, wave 2011; own calculations (only companies with low-skilled
workers).
per cent) or formalized HR practices (28 per cent). Employee-oriented HRM
is completely absent.
Second, there is a rather small group (cluster B: ‘Employee-Oriented
HRM’), in which all companies report employee-oriented HR policies.
Almost half of the companies (46 per cent) have formalized HR practices.
Yet, employee representations are completely absent, and only a minority of
companies reports bargaining coverage (33 per cent).
Third, there is a relatively large group of companies (cluster C:
‘Regulation’), in whichmost of the institutional characteristics are present. All
establishments of this cluster have employee representations. Formalized HR
practices (91 per cent) are also widely used. Employee-oriented HR policies
exist in two third of the companies (64 per cent). Bargaining coverage is
widespread (83 per cent).
In order to study the role of these different institutional configurations in
the training participation of low-skilled workers, three dummy variables (one
for each cluster) were defined and added to the regression models instead of
the single context characteristics (Table 5). The reference category is cluster A
(‘Low Embeddedness’).
The analysis provides evidence that the three identified configurations of
social embeddedness differ in both the likelihood of training investments
(model M6a) and training participation rates of low-skilled workers (model
M6b). Compared to the reference category (cluster A), companies in cluster
C (‘Regulation’) are more likely to provide continuing training to low-
skilled workers and show higher participation rates. Thus, the proportion of
low-skilled workers, who participated in continuing training, is significantly
higher than in the other two clusters. This finding is in line with hypothesis
H1 on the positive impact of institutional arrangements at the company
level. Companies in cluster B (‘Employee-Oriented HRM’), in contrast, are
more likely to invest in training for low-skilled workers, but do not have
significantly higher participation rates (as compared to clusterA). This finding
confirms hypothesis H2 on the positive impact of HRM practices. Both
findings underline the importance of specific institutional configurations.
Empirically, the selected company characteristics in terms of institutional
C© 2019 The Authors. British Journal of Industrial Relations published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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TABLE 5
Determinants of Training Participation of Low-Skilled Workers in 2013
Model 6a: Logistic regression; average marginal effects; standard errors in parentheses
Model 6b: OLS regression; standardized coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
Continuing training
low-skilled workers
yes/no
Training
participation rate
low-skilled workers
Model M6a (2013) M6b(2013)
Institutional company context (2011)
Cluster A: Low Embeddedness (n = 1,702) Ref. Ref.
Cluster B: Employee-Oriented HRM
(n = 933)
0.03(*) (0.02) 0.00 (0.01)
Cluster C: Regulation (n = 1,374) 0.07** (0.02) 0.05** (0.01)
Control variables Same control variables
as in Table 1
Same control
variables as in
Table 1
Pseudo R2/adjusted R2 0.20 0.20
n (establishments) 4,009 4,009
(*) significant on 10% level; * significant on 5% level; ** significant on 1% level.
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, waves 2011 and 2013; own calculations (only companies with
low-skilled workers).
arrangements andHRpolicies cluster together in characteristic configurations
that are related to significant differences in training participation of low-
skilled workers.
Additional analyses (not presented here) show evidence that the three
clusters are not correlated strongly with other company characteristics. In
this respect, they may be understood as a relatively independent determinant
of continuing training participation. Nonetheless, companies in cluster
C (‘Regulation’) are more often characterized by supportive company
characteristics in terms of training participation, such as large size, compound
operation or sectors that are more active in training. The cluster A (‘Low
Embeddedness’) is, however, less likely to be found in larger establishment.
In-depth-analyses (Appendix Table A2) provide evidence for sectoral
differences. The explored clusters work differently in specific sectoral settings.
In Manufacturing, cluster C (‘Regulation’) is related to both a significantly
higher training probability and a higher share of trained low-skilled workers
(as compared to cluster A). Cluster B (‘Employee-OrientedHRM’) relates to a
higher training probability but not to higher training participation rates. In the
Hotel Business and Gastronomy sector, cluster C (‘Regulation’) is only related
to a higher likelihood of training investments. Training participation rates do
not vary significantly between the different clusters. For Human Health and
Social Work, no significant relationship is found.
Robustness Check
The analyses presented in this article suffer from problems of endogeneity
since the data structure makes it impossible to use a panel approach with
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fixed effects or first differences. As a consequence, the results might be
jeopardized by biased variables and mistaken relationships. In order to tackle
this problem, a broad range of control variables have been included in the
analyses. All analyses have been controlled for general training incidence
(training investments in 2013), training participation rates of skilled workers
(2013) and investments in initial training. In addition (analyses not shown
here), the share of apprentices in the company and the presence of specific
training measures focused on older workers have been included in the models.
With the exception of employee-oriented HR polices, the effects of the
main explanatory variables (formalized HR practices, long-term contracts,
structures of employee representation and cluster C ‘Regulation’) remain
significant, confirming the robustness of the analyses.
Eventually, treatment-effect estimation (propensity score matching) was
used to encounter unobserved time invariant and time variant heterogeneity.
The analyses confirm the significant impact of formalized HR practices and
employee representations for the likelihood that firms invest in training of
low-skilled workers. It also provides evidence that the cluster ‘Regulation’
has a positive impact (though only at a 10 per cent significance level), while
the cluster ‘Low Embeddedness’ has a negative impact (at a 10 per cent
significance level). Regarding training participation of low-skilled workers,
formalized HR practices and structures of employee representation have a
significant positive effect. However, the effect of employee representations is
only significant when training participation of skilled workers is excluded.
With other words: Though structures of employee representation relate
to significantly higher training participation rates of low-skilled workers,
the relationship might be either caused by an overall positive impact of
employee representations on training participation or by a third unobserved
variable that relates to both training participation of skilled and low-
skilled workers. A fixed effect model would be needed to explore this
relationship further. Nevertheless, the analysis provides evidence that low-
skilled workers in companies with employee representation have significantly
higher levels of training participation. We do not find any evidence for a
treatment effect of employee-oriented HR policies. So, it is likely that the
weak effect in the regression models is rather caused by other observed or
unobserved influences.
5. Discussion
Through the German case, the article explored an issue that is relevant
across several countries: Though continuing training forms a key measure
for low-skilled workers to improve their labour market position and to
cope with fundamental changes in the world of work, their participation in
continuing training remains very low. Given this dilemma, the question aises,
how low-skilled workers can be better integrated in firm-provided continuing
training. Their low training participation was understood as a problem of
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uncertainty and lack of information. Because the returns and long-term
objectives related to training are uncertain and jeopardized by opportunistic
behaviour, companies tend to focus their training activities on employees
from which they expect relatively high and secure returns to training. Since
particularly low and uncertain returns to training are often attributed to low-
skilled workers, this group is included less often in continuing training.
Against this background, the article explored the role of institutional
arrangements at the organizational and sectoral level in Germany. To the
best of my knowledge, previous research has not explored this question
systematically. Most studies addressing institutional determinants have been
concerned with variations in overall training participation (see Bellmann et al.
2010; Käpplinger 2007), while studies that investigate training participation
of low-skilled workers have focused their interest on determinants like task
characteristics or labour shortages (see Bellmann et al. 2015; Mohr et al.
2016).
By building on institutional and organizational theory, the article derived
from the idea that institutional arrangements are able to foster training
participation of low-skilled workers. By either providing more information
on the actual productivity of low-skilled workers, or establishing alternative
criteria for training investments (solidarism), they increase the chance that
firms integrate (more) low-skilled workers in continuing training.
Analyses of data of the IAB Establishment Panel (waves 2011 and 2013)
confirmed this expectation for a large part. In addition to key labour market
and company characteristics (such as size, workforce composition and labour
shortages), the institutional organizational and sectoral context shapes the
training participation of low-skilled workers. At the organizational level,
formalized HR practices are related to both a higher training probability and
higher training participation of low-skilled workers. In addition, structures of
employee representation increase the likelihood that firms invest in training
for low-skilled workers. There is also evidence that training participation
rates of low-skilled workers are significantly higher in firms with employee
representations. However, additional analyses (propensity score matching)
could not confirm a significant treatment effect. Further research using fixed
effects models is needed to evaluate this relationship further.
In-depth analyses on configurations of institutional influences have
shown that low-skilled workers benefit in organizational clusters that are
characterized by structures of employee representation, formalized HR
practices and bargaining coverage. This result is in line with findings of the
newer organizational research stating thatHRpolicies alone are often not able
to counteract processes of statistical discrimination, but need to be supported
by corporate actors (Steinback et al. 2010: 231).
However, no positive effect on training participation was found for
companies with (exclusively) permanent employment contracts. On the
contrary: low-skilled workers in these companies have a significantly lower
training probability. One possible explanation relates to the indicator used
in this study. Because of data limitations, the actual employment duration of
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low-skilled workers was not considered. This might be problematic, since staff
turnover can be high and prevent long-term employment relationships even
when the establishment has (exclusively) permanent employment contracts.
Another possible explanation refers to long-term effects of high temporal
embeddedness. When companies with long-term employment relationships
are more likely to train their unskilled work force, these training investments
might already have taken place in the past. As a result, the need to train this
group is decreasing over time and leading to a lower training probability.
At the sectoral level, the overall influence of collective agreements on
the training behaviour of firms (regarding low-skilled workers) is weak. We
only find evidence that collective bargaining coverage is positively related
to the likelihood that the firm invests in training for low-skilled workers in
Human Health and Social Work. Apart from that, firms covered by collective
agreements do not train significant higher shares of low-skilled workers. This
might be explained by the fact that most collective agreements in Germany do
not address explicitly issues of continuing training (Bahnmüller and Hoppe
2012). If they do so (like in the metal or electric industry), regulations
concerning continuing training are usually soft and not explicitly focused
on low-skilled workers. As shown above, formalized HR practices at the
organizational level have a stronger impact, in this respect.
In line with the predictions derived from the comparative political economy
literature (Thelen and Busemeier 2008; Thelen 2009, 2014), the analyses
provide evidence that firms in most service sectors are less likely to train
their low-skilled workers than firms in the manufacturing sector (indicating
dualism), while both the likelihood of training investments and participation
rates in the sector Human Health and Social Work are significantly higher.
School-based vocational education and public regulations that are more
dominant in this sector (Bechmann et al. 2012; Thelen 2014) seem to foster
training participation of low-skilled workers. Unfortunately, it is not possible
with this dataset to study and disentangle the effects of the skill formation
system on the one hand and public policies and legal regulations on the other
hand. We should also be aware that higher rates of training participation
in this sector are often resulting from short-term and task-oriented training
measures that do not necessary lead to better career or income prospects for
low-skilled workers.
Eventually, this study revealed interesting differences between sectors
underlining the need to consider the sectoral context more carefully in future
research and to explore the varying role of institutional arrangements for
different sectors.
In the Manufacturing sector, HRM policies in terms of formalized
HR practices and employee-oriented policies are related to both a higher
likelihood of training investments and higher training participation rates
among low-skilled workers. Moreover, the cluster analyses provide evidence
that companies with institutional arrangements in terms of bargaining
coverage, employee representation or formalized HR practices show
significantly higher levels of training investments in low-skilled workers.
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In the sectorHumanHealth and SocialWork, in contrast, skill requirements
are to a large extent regulated at the legal level. Under this condition,
institutional arrangements and HRM policies are of minor importance.
However, collective bargaining coverage increases the chance of training
investments for low-skilled workers. We do not find evidence that collective
bargaining coverage relates to a better integration of low-skilled workers
(solidarism) in precarious segments of the service economy, such as Hotel
Business and Gastronomy. Low-skilled workers in this sector are particularly
disadvantaged in terms of low employment security, part-time work and low
pay. As the cluster analysis has shown, institutional arrangements at the firm
level (in terms of collective bargaining coverage, employee representation or
formalized HR practices) are related to a higher likelihood of investments
in training for low-skilled workers, but not to higher participation rates.
Formalized HR practices, however, seem to have a positive impact on training
participation rates.
6. Conclusions
This study contributes to the existing body of literature on issues of social
exclusion and inequality in coordinated market economies. Overall, the
results underline the importance of institutional arrangements at the company
and sectoral level for the training participation of low-skilled workers. It
contributes to issues of social exclusion and inequality in coordinated market
economies by exploring the role of institutional arrangements in continuing
training participation of low-skilled workers.
In line with predictions from the comparative political economy literature,
this study found evidence for a dualism regarding training gaps between
sectors and workers. Low-skilled workers in most service sectors are less
often included in employer-provided continuing training (as compared to the
manufacturing sector). Scholars from comparative political economy have
suggested that inclusive unions and public policies are important keys to
overcome this dualism (Doellgast et al. 2018; Thelen 2014). However, the
overall impact of collective bargaining on the training participation of low-
skilled workers is low. Regardless, whether we look at core (Manufacturing)
or precarious (Hotel Business and Gastronomy) segments of the German
economy, collective agreements are not related to significant differences in
terms of training participation. At the same time, the example of the sector
HumanHealth and SocialWork suggests that continuing training participation
of low-skilled workers is related to public regulations and school-based
vocational education both establishing a higher need to obtain supplement
skills over the course of life. This finding supports the idea that large upfront
investments in firm-specific and portable skills (as they are typical for the
German dual-apprenticeship system) are related to rather moderate levels
of life-long learning in Germany (Thelen 2014) with negative effects on the
training participation of low-skilled workers.
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One key finding of this study refers to the role of organizations. It showed
evidence that the training participation of low-skilled workers is shaped by
institutional arrangements and HR policies at the organizational level. This
finding underlines the need to consider and study institutional differences
between organizations more carefully. A cluster analysis could identify
characteristic institutional configurations at the firm level that are related to
variations in training participation of low-skilled workers. A major role is
played by structures of employee representation and formalized HR practices,
such as written plans for staff development, formally laid down procedures
for vacant appointments, job descriptions, written target agreements or
written evaluations of job performance. In contrast to most technical- or
market-driven determinants, such as investments in EDP, recent innovations
or labour shortages, which increase training demands for low-skilled workers
in the short run, the effects of both employee representation and formalized
HR practices are enduring and substantial.
For the large number of enterprises without employee representations
and formalized HR procedures, substitute regulations and initiatives at the
collective bargaining and state level are needed. The positive effect of public
regulation was evidenced by high training participation rates among low-
skilled workers in the sectors Human Health and Social Work. Collective
agreements can play an important role, too. Yet, their overall impact on the
training participation of low-skilled workers is still weak, indicating the need
to incorporatemore binding regulations in order to commit companies to take
care of the long-term employability of their work force.
While this study found clear evidence that the decision of employers to
invest in training for low-skilled workers is influenced by sector and company
context, training participation rates of low-skilled workers were explained
to a minor extent. Obstacles at the individual or household level, such as
learning barriers, earning constellations or care demands, can prevent training
participation despite given opportunities at the company level (Asplund 2005;
Oosterbeek 1998). Future research should also address the problem of low
training participation despite existing employer initiatives, for example by
studying the role of different forms of learning, tailored to individual learning
abilities or by including the (temporal) organization of learning activities
(Dobischat et al. 2002; Wotschack 2019).
Independently from the social and institutional company context, some
economic and market-related factors influence the likelihood that low-skilled
workers receive continuing training. The chance increases when the company
is of large size, faces labour shortages or employs a large share of low-
skilled workers. In this respect, higher skill demands due to demographic
change might increase the training opportunities for low-skilled workers.
The willingness to invest into this group seems to be growing. However,
previous research shows evidence that low-skilled workers still benefit less
from labour market shortages than skilled workers (Bellmann et al. 2015;
Seyda and Werner 2012). And, as we have seen in this study, institutionalized
arrangements can make an important difference here.
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Eventually, this study approached low training participation of low-skilled
workers as a problem of discrimination by employers and investigated the
role of different institutional arrangements in overcoming this problem.
The question whether or not it is economically beneficial for the employer
to train low-skilled workers (in a cost–benefit sense) remained outside
the consideration. No distinction was made between ‘efficient’ or ‘non-
efficient’ continuing training from the employer’s point of view or in the
sense of human-capital theory. There remains the possibility that certain
institutional determinants (like employee representation) increase the training
participation of low-skilled workers without any direct economic benefit for
the firm. However, it is very difficult to evaluate what ‘efficient’ training is.
There might be returns to training that are not very beneficial for the firm,
but for the workers (by increasing their skills and job opportunities), for
the labour market (by supplying better skilled workers) and the society (by
saving social spending and contributing to social cohesion). Even from the
employer’s perspective, training of low-skilled workers that has little effect in
the short run might be very beneficial in the long run, when labour shortages
or technological and organizational change put more pressure on the firm.
Employer-provided training is for a larger part short-term and task oriented.
Investments in general occupational skills and professional qualifications are
not in the core of the interest of employers. When low-skilled workers should
get access to this important area of (formal) continuing training leading
to professional qualifications, state initiatives, legal regulations and public
policies are in demand.
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Appendix
TABLE A1
Descriptives Merged Data (Waves 2011 and 2013)
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Investment in training (all workers) 2013 0.74 (0.54) 0.44 0.00 1.00
Investment in training for low-skilled workers 2013 0.23 (0.12) 0.42 0.00 1.00
Training participation rate all workers 2013 0.29 (0.24) 0.32 0.00 1.00
Training participation rate low-skilled workers 2013 0.12 (0.08) 0.29 0.00 1.00
Training participation rate skilled workers 2013 0.63 (0.78) 0.38 0.00 1.00
TPR (2013) based on persons (not cases) 0.60 (0.49) 0.49 0.00 1.00
Company size >250 (2011) 0.13 (0.01) 0.34 0.00 1.00
Company size 50–249 (2011) 0.29 (0.08) 0.45 0.00 1.00
Company size 10–49 (2011) 0.36 (0.38) 0.48 0.00 1.00
Company size 1–9 (2011) 0.22 (0.53) 0.41 0.00 1.00
Stable employment (2011) 0.85 (0.87) 0.42 0.00 1.00
Share of women (2011) 0.47 (0.52) 0.29 0.00 1.00
Share of high-skilled workers (2011) 0.08 (0.05) 0.15 0.00 0.97
Share of older workers (50+) (2011) 0.28 (0.27) 0.19 0.00 1.00
Share of part-time workers (2011) 0.28 (0.36) 0.26 0.00 1.00
Share of low-skilled workers (2011) 0.30 (0.37) 0.26 0.00 1.00
Region (West Germany) (2011) 0.71 (0.87) 0.45 0.00 1.00
Modern technical equipment (2011) 0.66 (0.62) 0.47 0.00 1.00
Business situation very good or good (2010) 0.42 (0.42) 0.49 0.00 1.00
Labour shortages (skilled workers) (2010) 0.35 (0.19) 0.48 0.00 1.00
Recent innovation (2010) 0.51 (0.39) 0.50 0.00 1.00
Investment in EDP (2010) 0.47 (0.31) 0.50 0.00 1.00
Collective agreement (2011) 0.49 (0.37) 0.50 0.00 1.00
Formalized HR practice (2011) 0.54 (0.26) 0.50 0.00 1.00
Employee-oriented HR policies (2011) 0.45 (0.37) 0.50 0.00 1.00
Long-term employment contracts (2011) 0.66 (0.40) 0.47 0.00 1.00
Work councils or employee representation (2011) 0.42 (0.19) 0.49 0.00 1.00
Sectors (2011)
(1) Agriculture and Foresting 0.02 (0.02) 0.14 0.00 1.00
(2) Mining and Quarrying / / 0.00 1.00
(3) Electricity, Gas, Water Supply 0.02 (0.01) 0.13 0.00 1.00
(4) Manufacturing 0.27 (0.12) 0.45 0.00 1.00
(5) Construction 0.05 (0.07) 0.22 0.00 1.00
(6) Trade 0.14 (0.21) 0.34 0.00 1.00
(7) Transport and Warehousing 0.04 (0.04) 0.19 0.00 1.00
(8) Information and Communication 0.01 (0.01) 0.10 0.00 1.00
(9) Hotel Business and Gastronomy 0.07 (0.13) 0.25 0.00 1.00
(10) Financial and Insurance Services 0.02 (0.02) 0.14 0.00 1.00
(11) Business and Professional Services 0.10 (0.14) 0.30 0.00 1.00
(12) Education 0.03 (0.03) 0.18 0.00 1.00
(13) Human Health and Social Work 0.12 (0.12) 0.33 0.00 1.00
(14) Other Services 0.02 (0.04) 0.15 0.00 1.00
(15) Public Administration 0.08 (0.04) 0.27 0.00 1.00
n = 4,009
Note: Weighted values in parantheses.
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, waves 2011 and 2013 (merged); own calculations (only
companies with low-skilled workers).
C© 2019 The Authors. British Journal of Industrial Relations published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
616 British Journal of Industrial Relations
TABLE A2
Determinants of Training Participation of Low-Skilled Workers in Different Sectors
Manufacturing
Continuing training
low-skilled workers
yes/no
Training
participation rate
low-skilled workers
Model M7a (2013) M7b (2013)
Institutional company context (2011)
Cluster A: Low Embeddedness (n = 1,702) Ref. Ref.
Cluster B: Employee-Oriented HRM
(n = 933)
1.59(*) (0.38) 0.03 (0.02)
Cluster C: Regulation (n = 1,374) 1.82** (0.39) 0.05* (0.02)
Control variables Same control variables
as in Table 1
Same control
variables as in
Table 1
Pseudo R2/adjusted R2 0.21 0.30
n (establishments) 1,097 1,097
Hotel Business and Gastronomy
Continuing training
low-skilled workers
yes/no
Training
participation rate
low-skilled workers
Model M8a (2013) M8b (2013)
Institutional company context (2011)
Cluster A: Low Embeddedness (n = 1,702) Ref. Ref.
Cluster B: Employee-Oriented HRM
(n = 933)
0.93 (0.47) 0.01 (0.03)
Cluster C: Regulation (n = 1,374) 3.02(*) (2.03) 0.04 (0.05)
Control variables Same control variables
as in Table 1
Same control
variables as in
Table 1
Pseudo R2/adjusted R2 0.35 0.23
n (establishments) 278 278
Human Health and Social Work
Continuing training
low-skilled workers
yes/no
Training
participation rate
low-skilled workers
Model M9a (2013) M9b (2013)
Institutional company context (2011)
Cluster A: Low Embeddedness (n = 1,702) Ref. Ref.
Cluster B: Employee-Oriented HRM
(n = 933)
1.25 (0.43) –0.04 (0.04)
Cluster C: Regulation (n = 1,374) 1.20 (0.37) –0.02 (0.04)
Control variables Same control variables
as in Table 1
Same control
variables as in
Table 1
Pseudo R2/adjusted R2 0.28 0.32
n (establishments) 500 500
(*) significant on 10% level; * significant on 5% level; ** significant on 1% level.
Note: Models M7a, M8a, M9a: Logistic regression; AME; standard errors in parentheses.
Models M7b, M8b, M9b: OLS regression; standardized coefficients, standard errors in
parentheses.
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, waves 2011 and 2013; own calculations (only companies with
low-skilled workers).
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